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Abstract
We calculate the relative abundance of the radioactive isotopes Iodine-131 and
Cesium-137 produced by nuclear fission in reactors and compare it with data taken at
the troubled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. The ratio of radioactivities of
these two isotopes can be used to obtain information about when the nuclear reactions
terminated.
1
1. Introduction The current state of the troubled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power
plant is of considerable concern. The plant, on the east shore of Fukushima prefecture was
first hit, at 14:46 pm local time on March 11, 2011, by the magnitude 9.0 earthquake on
the Richter scale about 150 km east of Honshu, the main island of Japan, and then hit by a
giant tsunami, exceeding 14 m high, about one hour after the earthquake. Although three
reactors (Units 1, 2, 3), which had been on operation at the plant, were automatically shut
down immediately after the earthquake, the emergent electric power generators, working
after the loss of external power supply, for cooling the reactor system were knocked out
by the tsunami. Uncontrolled decay heat from the fuel rods has caused serious trouble in
containing the radioactive materials which had been accumulated in the reactors and in the
spent-fuel rods in the cooling pools. Explosions of hydrogen gas, created by the reaction
of the heated Zirconium fuel cladding with water vapor, took place at the buildings of the
Units 1, 3, and 4 reactors, severely damaging those buildings.
At the moment, only very limited information is available about the interior conditions
of the reactor complex owing to the highly radioactive environment, with intense gamma
rays from radioactive materials that apparently escaped from the reactors preventing direct
human access for inspections. However, certain information has been released by the Tokyo
Electric Power Company (TEPCO)1) on measurements of the radioactivity at several moni-
toring posts near the troubled reactors and from a water sample taken from the spent-fuel
cooling pool of the Unit-4 reactor building.2)
We call attention here to the significance of the relative strength of the reported ra-
dioactivities of different radioactive isotopes. In particular, we focus on the two radioactive
isotopes abundantly produced by fission, the Iodine isotope I-131 and the Cesium isotope
Cs-137; the former has the half-life of 8 days while for the latter it is 30 years. The ratio
should decrease on the time scale of days after the termination of nuclear fission processes
and hence may be used for measuring the age of the fission products, similar to the carbon
dating method using the ratio of C-14 to C-12 in the remains of ancient life.3)
One crucial difference between the proposed iodine-cesium dating and carbon dating is
that while the initial condition of the latter is essentially fixed by the equilibrium C-14/C-
12 ratio in atmosphere with respect to cosmic ray interactions, the initial condition of the
former depends on the prehistory of controlled nuclear reactions in the reactor. Another
potential problem, which does not exist for carbon dating, is the effect of the different
chemical properties of iodine and cesium∗) possibly reflected in the change of their relative
abundance depending on the environment in which they are found, for example in the water
∗) This problem can be avoided by using Cs-134 and Cs-137. However, Cs-134 has a half-life of 2 years
which is too long to see observable effects in the currently available data.
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(fresh or sea), in the air, or in aerosols.4)
With these caveats in mind, we make a simple estimate of time-dependent numbers of
I-131 and Cs-137 nuclei produced from a uranium burning nuclear reactor and then examine
the data of the water samples released by TEPCO taken at several monitoring posts near
the troubled Fukushima nuclear reactor plant, including sea water at the Southern Discharge
Channel, Unit-4 cooling pool, Sub-drain (under ground) water, and sea water taken at the
Intake Canal. Some of these data show anomalously high iodine-cesium ratios compared
to the values expected for the nuclear fuels in the reactors if the nuclear fission has indeed
terminated before the outbreak of the accident. We draw tentative conclusions from these
analyses of the data at the end.
2. Iodine-cesium ratios in nuclear reactors We assume that in an operating nuclear
reactor, where criticality is sustained for chain nuclear fission reactions, these isotopes are
produced with a constant production rate, while the produced isotopes decay exponentially
with a constant decay rate. The number of I-131 isotopes created by a nuclear reactor which
had been in operation from time ti to tf is then given at later time t by
∗)
NI(t) =
∫ tf
ti
dt′fIN0e
−λI(t−t
′), (1)
where N0 is the number of fissions per unit time, fI is the fraction of the I-131 produced per
fission, and the decay rate λI is given in terms of the half-life by τI = ln 2/λI = 8 days. The
integration gives
NI(t) = fIN0e
−λI(t−tf )
1− e−λI (tf−ti)
λI
≃
fIN0
λI
e−λI(t−tf ), (2)
where we have assumed that the working time of the reactor is much longer than the half-life
of I-131, λI(tf − ti) ≫ 1. The abundance of I-131 saturates on a time scale τI and remains
constant during the operation of the reactor.
A similar estimate can be made for Cs-137. In this case, however, the decay of Cs-137
is very slow, with a long half-life τCs = ln 2/λCs = 30 years; hence λCs(tf − ti) ≪ 1 and we
obtain
NCs(t) = fCsN0e
−λCs(t−tf )
1− e−λCs(tf−ti)
λCs
≃ fCsN0∆te
−λCs(t−tf ), (3)
∗) This result may be obtained by integration of the equation, dNI/dt = fIN0θ(t; t1, tf ) − λINI, where
θ(t; ti, tf ) = 1 for ti < t < tf and θ(t; ti, tf ) = 0 otherwise, with the initial condition NI(ti) = 0.
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where ∆t = tf − ti is the time interval that the reactor has been in operation. The Cs-137
accumulates during the operation of the reactor due to its long lifetime, and hence becomes
proportional to ∆t.
The radioactivity of each of these elements measured in becquerel (Bq) is given by the
decay rates
ΓI(t) = −
dNI
dt
= fIN0e
−λI(t−tf ) (4)
and
ΓCs(t) = −
dNCs
dt
= fCsN0λCs∆te
−λCs(t−tf ), (5)
so that the ratio becomes
RI/Cs(t) =
fI
fCs
τCs
∆t ln 2
(
1
2
)(t−tf )/τI
, (6)
where we have again used the condition λCs(t−tf )≪ 1. This formula gives the average ratio
of the radioactivities of I-131 and Cs-137 contained in the fuel rods after the termination of
the nuclear reaction at tf .
The fractions of each fission product are fI = 2.88 × 10
−2, fCs = 6.22 × 10
−2 for the
cumulative thermal fission yields of U-235, taken from the IAEA data base.5) For the three
Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear reactors in operation at the time tX of the earthquake, the ratio
at t = tX was
RI/Cs(tX) =
fI
fCs
τCs
∆t ln 2
=
240
∆t
, (7)
where ∆t is measured in months. If we choose ∆t = 7(12) months then RI/Cs(tX) = 34(20).
On April 12, this ratio would be reduced by factor 232/8 = 16 to 2.1 (1.3).
3. Deciphering the Fukushima nuclear accident data We now examine the data released
by TEPCO for the Fukushima nuclear accident in the light of our theoretical estimates of the
ratios of the Iodine-131 and Cesium-137 accumulated in the nuclear reactors and attempt
to read their implications.
(i) Sea water at the Southern Discharge Channel: In Fig. 1, we show a semi-log plot of the
ratio (6) against the number of days past X-day (March 11, 2011) with two different values
for ∆t; the upper line corresponds to ∆t = 7 months and the lower line to ∆t = 1 year.
Note that the slopes of these lines are fixed by the half-life of I-131; only the normalization
changes with a change of ∆t. The larger the value of ∆t, the lower the position of the line.
The blue dots are the data of the sea water samples taken at the South Discharge Channel,
a monitoring post located 330 m south of the Discharge Channel of the Unit-1 – 4 reactor
sites.6) The data are better fit by the lower line with ∆t = 1 year, but the slope is a little
4
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Fig. 1. (color online) Ratio of the radioactivities of I-131 and Cs-137 plotted against number of
days since the earthquake (March 11, 2011). The blue solid line (∆t = 12 months) and the
blue dashed line (∆t = 7 months) are the theoretical lines based on the formula (6); the blue
dots are the measured ratios from the samples of sea water taken at the southern monitoring
post. The red dots are the data of the water samples of the Unit-4 reactor cooling pool.
steeper for the data taken for the first 50 days. As mentioned, the slope of the decay line is
essentially fixed by the half-life of I-131, so this may at first look puzzling. The change of
the slope may, however, well have been caused by the mixture of 9000 tons of old low level
contaminated water which had been discharged from the Central Radioactive Waste Disposal
Facility from April 4 to 10.7) In these wastes I-131 had been completely depleted and only
long half-life isotopes like Cs-137 were present. The slope tends to decrease slightly later.
This change may be caused by the leakage of contaminated water with large iodine-cesium
ratio from Unit-2 reactor site, as we shall see later.
Although we have ignored the effects caused by the chemical or physical differences of
iodine and cesium in compound formation, ionization, diffusion, etc., the overall fit of the
sea water data with the present theoretical calculation is very encouraging.
(ii) Unit-4 cooling pool: We now turn our attention to the spent-fuel rods in the Unit-4
cooling pool. Note that the Unit-4 reactor was not in operation at the time of the earthquake.
The same ratio for the fission products contained in the spent-fuel rods in the Unit-4 cooling
pool should be smaller by an extra attenuation factor
(
1
2
)(tX−tf )/τI
= 1/290/8 ≃ 1/2400, (8)
if all these fuel rods were intact since they had been removed from the Unit-4 reactor three
months earlier (December 2010). Since some of the fuel could be older, this ratio may be
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even smaller.8) The calculated ratio is not, however, consistent with what has been reported.
According to the TEPCO press release on April 14,2) the radioactivities of 220 Bq/cc of I-131
and 93 Bq/cc of Cs-137 have been detected from the water sample taken on April 12 from
the Unit-4 cooling pool, where more than 1500 spent-fuel rods were stored. The data were
analyzed on April 13. The ratio 2.4 is closer to the values of the ratio of the radioactivities
from the other reactors, as shown by the red dot in Fig. 1.9)
If the data are correct, they would imply that at least some of the radioactive fission
products found in the Unit-4 cooling pool have been produced by nuclear reactions that
took place at around time tX or later.
∗) One possible explanation could be contamination by
fallout of the fission products created in the neighboring reactors.∗∗) The iodine-cesium ratio
of the water sample taken from the Unit-3 cooling pool and measured on May 8, however,
has turned out to be 0.079;10) this value is about factor 3 smaller than the same ratio 0.24
for the water of Unit-4 cooling pool measured on the same day,11) but instead fits to the
decay line of the sea water data, suggesting that the radioactivity of the sea water has
been caused by the fall-out of the radioactive material released by the hydrogen explosions.
Although the difference of the ratios in Unit-3 and Unit-4 cooling pools may be caused by
fluctuations of the distribution of the fallout, we may take this difference more seriously and
seek other explanation for the origin of high iodine-cesium ratio found in the Unit-4 cooling
pool. Another possible explanation could be that a nuclear chain reaction was reignited in
the melted used fuel in the Unit-4 cooling pool for a certain period.
We now explore whether criticality had been re-established only briefly, in a period δt
from time t′i to t
′
f = t
′
i + δt. For simplicity in the following analysis, we assume δt≪ τI = 8
days. This would be reasonable since the heat produced by a nuclear reaction in a chunk
of the melted fuel would cause rapid disintegration of the chunk, terminating criticality. In
this case, the number of newly produced I-131 nuclei increases in proportion to δt:
δNI(t) ≃ fIN1δte
−λI(t−t
′
f
), (9)
where N1 is the average number of nuclear fissions per unit time taking place during this
brief time period. Similarly the number of newly produced Cs-137 nuclei is
δNCs(t) ≃ fCsN1δte
−λCs(t−t
′
f
), (10)
∗) We have tacitly assumed that the solubility of iodine or cesium in water is not changed considerably
by boric acid, which has been added to the water to suppress chain nuclear reactions.
∗∗) Actually, the hydrogen explosions of the Unit-4 reactor building took place on March 15 after the
explosion of the Unit-3 reactor building on March 14. However, the explosion on March 15 may have sent
fallout from the hydrogen explosion of the Unit-3 building on the roof of the Unit-4 reactor building into
the pool. The author thanks Professor Ichimura for calling his attention to these subtle points.
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so that the ratio of the radioactivities of the newly produced I-131 and Cs-137 would be
RnewI/Cs(t) =
fI
fCs
τCs
τI
e−λI(t−t
′
f
) = 630×
(
1
2
)(t−t′
f
)/τI
. (11)
This result with the replacement t′f → tX also gives an upper bound on the radioactivity
ratio for the fission products created in the reactor under normal conditions before X-day
for short ∆t.
The radioactivity measured in the sample water taken from the Unit-4 cooling pool could
perhaps be from a mixture of the newly created radioactive fission products and the remnant
of old fission products which is mostly composed of Cs-137, since I-131 has been depleted
considerably, leading to the ratio 2.4 accidentally coincident with the ratio from the other
reactors. In any event, the amount of new fission products may be small since the absolute
value of the measured radioactivity in the sample is not significant.∗)
(iii) Sub-drain water: The data from water samples taken from four sub-drains near the
reactor buildings show even more puzzling features, as shown in Fig. 2.12) In particular,
the water samples from the sub-drain near the Unit-2 reactor building show an anomalously
high radioactivity ratio∗∗) even greater than the upper bound given by (11) if the nuclear
fission ends on X-day as indicated by the red solid line in the figure. If there is no strong
chemical filtering effect in draining contaminated water from the reactor buildings, it would
be difficult to understand the observed anomaly near the Unit-2 reactor without assuming
that a significant amount of fission products were produced at least 10 – 15 days after X-day.
We note that several step-wise sequential characteristic changes have been observed in the
Unit-2 sub-drain data with largest change on May 11 (60 days from X-day). The causes of
these changes are still unknown to the author, but it is tempting to speculate that they were
caused by the mixing of the new fission products with the old ones released three times later
from the remaining fuel rods in the Unit-2 reactor or from the water from other reactor site,
as we shall see later.
∗) The total amount of the radioactivity by I-131 contained in the water of Unit-4 cooling pool, which
normally contains about 1500 tons of water, may be estimated as 220× 1.5× 109 = 3.3× 1011 Bq (on April
13) which is small compared to the radioactivity of fresh fission products contained in the nuclear reactor,
which is the order of 1018 Bq (on X-day). If we assume that these I-131 isotopes detected in the Unit-4
cooling pool were produced by nuclear fissions reignited inside the pool after X-day, the upper bound of the
total number of fissions occurred may be estimated as Nf = 3.3× 10
11 × 232/8 × τI/fI = 1.3× 10
20, which
would have produced an extra heat ∆U = Nf×200 MeV = 4.1×10
9J. This extra heat produced is equivalent
to a latent heat absorbed by about 2 tons of boiling water, which is not significant if one compares it to the
decay heat produced daily during the period by the used fuel rods in the cooling pool and therefore may
have been easily unnoticed. This, however, may not exclude a possibility that nuclear reaction had reignited
on a larger scale and some extra fission products had escaped from the pool together with violently boiling
water by sudden release of large amount of heat.
∗∗) The author thanks Gordon Baym for calling his attention to this point.
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Sub-drain water
Fig. 2. (color online) Same plot as Fig. 1, now including the data of the water samples taken from
the sub-drains near the Unit-1 (green), Unit-2 (gray), Unit-3 (cyan) and Unit-4 (pink) reactor
buildings. Two more theoretical lines are shown as a guide to the eye; they are computed from
formula (6) with ∆t = 3 months (dashed green) and formula (11) with t′f = tX (solid red),
which gives an upper bound if the fission ended on X-day.
The data from the Unit-3 sub-drain before April 23 sit close to the decay line which fits
the sea water data, hence they may be understood as due to radiation from fission products
produced before the X-day. However, the data of the Unit-1 sub-drain and Unit-4 sub-
drain give a high radioactivity ratio, even larger than that of the samples from the Unit-4
cooling pool and from the Unit-3 sub-drain. The data therefore cannot be explained by the
contamination of the old fission products which had existed in the spent-fuel rods in the Unit-
4 cooling pool. The data occasionally show very different characteristics which are difficult
to be understood unless there was considerable mixing of waters belonging to different sub-
drains due to in-flow and out-flow of water through underground water channels. We note
that the anomalously large iodine-cesium ratios were observed also in the sub-drain water in
Unit-3 and Unit-4 reactor sites in June, and I-131 has been detected in the sub-drain water
at Unit-1 and Unit-3 reactor sites briefly even as late as August 31, July 28, respectively.
It is difficult, however, to judge the significance of these data since there were considerably
large fluctuations.
(iv) Intake Canal water: We show a few more plots of the data available for sea water
samples taken near the Intake Canal of the Unit-1 – 4 reactor sites that may fill the gap
between the previous sea water data (Fig. 1) and the sub-drain water data (Fig. 2).∗) We
note that a leakage of contaminated water from the water-intake of Unit-2 reactor had been
∗) The author thanks Ryogo Hayano for calling his attention to the Intake Canal data.
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Sea water at Shallow Draft Quay
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Sea water in the Intake Canal
Fig. 3. (color online) Same plot as Fig. 1, with the data samples from the shallow draft quay
(cyan) and at north (green) and south (pink) sides of the Intake Canal of Unit-1 – 4 reactors.
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Outside of the silt fences at unit 1-4 intakes
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Inside of the silt fences at unit 1-4 intake
Fig. 4. (color online) Same plot as Fig. 1, with the data samples from the outside (left panel)
and inside (right panel) of the silt fences at bar screens of Unit-1 (green), Unit-2 (gray), Unit-
3 (cyan) and Unit-4 (pink) reactor sites. The open square is the ratio of I-131 and Cs-137
measured for the highly humid air (99.9%) sampled inside the Unit-2 reactor building.
reported on April 2nd, and this prompted to monitor the radioactive isotopes contained
in the contaminated water near the intake of Unit-2 reactor.13) The left panel of Fig. 3
corresponds to the sea water at the Shallow Draft Quay, located just outside of the canal,
while the right panel is for the samples taken at the north (green) and south (pink) sides of
the Intake Canal: the north monitoring post is located near the Unit-1 reactor intake, while
the south post is near the Unit-4 reactor intake. Although the available data is limited,
all these ratios seem to have stayed very close to the values of the sea water data taken
at the southern monitoring post 330 m away from the canal until April 10 (30 days from
X-day) and then started to deviate; the deviation becomes bigger at the north monitoring
post than at the south, indicating that it is caused by the change of character of the sea
water due to mixing with new contaminated water leaking out from the Unit-2 reactor. A
sudden drop of the ratio has been observed on May 10 (60 days after X day) in these plots.
This change may be caused by the leakage of contaminated water found in the pit of Unit-3
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reactor sites; the iodine-cesium ratio may have been small in the water leaking out from the
Unit-3 reactor and hence considerably diluted the ratio of pre-existing water in the canal
with large iodine-cesium ratio.14) After May 11 when the leakage from the intake of Unit-3
reactor was stopped, the ratios started to increase again and the Intake Canal data exceed
the upper bound (red line) allowable, had the nuclear reaction terminated on the X day. We
would also like to note that the iodine-cesium ratio in the contaminated water leaked from
the Unit-3 reactor site is very close to the ratio found in the southern monitoring post 330 m
south of these troubled reactors. This may not be just a coincidence.
To locate the origin of the increase of the ratios, we plot in Fig. 4 the data taken at the
bar screens of the individual water intakes for Unit-1 – 4 reactors: the left (right) panel is
a plot of the data taken outside (inside) of the silt fences which have been installed at the
bar screen of the intake of the Unit-2 reactor site since April 18, and at the bar screens of
the other three reactor sites since May 12. The radioactivity ratios of iodine-131 and Cs-137
for the water outside of the fences show very similar behavior, with striking similarity to
the north Intake Canal data (the green dots in the right panel of Fig. 3). On the other
hand, the water sample taken inside the silt fences shows clear difference of characteristics
from the water coming from individual reactor sites: the water coming from the pit of the
Unit-2 reactor site has in particular an anomalously large iodine-cesium ratio. This is quali-
tatively similar to what we have observed for the sub-drain water, while the ratio fluctuates
more rapidly in the water leaking out of the pit of Unit-2 reactor site. It is apparent that
the contaminated water leaking out of the Unit-2 reactor site is responsible for the over-all
changes of the iodine-cesium ratios of the other parts of the water in the Intake Canal. It
is interesting to note that the air sample taken from a very humid (99.9%) air inside the
Unit-2 reactor building has a very high iodine-cesium ratio of 0.51 even 99 days after X day,
close to the value measured for the water coming out of the Unit-2 pit.15)
4. Conclusions: In these notes we have estimated the radioactivity ratios of iodine
isotope I-131 and cesium isotope Cs-137 accumulated in the nuclear reactor and compared
the results with the data of the Fukushima nuclear reactor accidents released by TEPCO
for the first 100 days after the outbreak of the accident. Although there are still many
uncertainties in connecting our estimates of the ratio in the nuclear reactor to the ratios
measured in the water sampled outside of of the reactors, as mentioned in the very beginning
of these notes, the results are rather provocative.
The ratio of the measured radioactivity of I-131 and Cs-137 may be used to extract useful
information about when these fission products were produced in the nuclear reactor complex
of the Fukushima Dai-ichi plant. The sea water data taken at southern monitoring post are
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consistent with the expected radioactivity by the fission products which had been produced
before the earthquake and perhaps released by the hydrogen explosions of Unit-1 and -3
reactor buildings. The data of the water samples from the Unit-4 cooling pool and from
areas near the Unit-2 reactor, however, show an anomaly which may indicate, if the data
are correct, that some of these fission products were produced by chain nuclear reactions
reignited after the earthquake.
Some of these results may well be affected by chemical, thermodynamic and/or transport
effects which are not taken into account in the present analysis. Estimates of these effects are
rather difficult problems which would require detailed knowledge of the course of the accident
in addition to various engineering problems related to the reactor design. Hopefully, more
direct information concerning the interior conditions of the troubled reactors and the used
fuel rods in the cooling pool will eventually become available and will clarify what actually
had happened at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi reactor complex.
The author thanks Professors Gordon Baym, Munetake Ichimura and Koichi Yazaki for
their interest in this work and for helpful communications. In particular, he is grateful to
Professor Ichimura for patiently elucidating some of the data released by TEPCO and to
Professor Baym for carefully reading these notes. He is grateful to Professor Ryogo Hayano
for sharing his insights on many related aspects of the data for the Fukushima nuclear
accident and for calling the author’s attention to the intake canal data, and to Professor
Mamoru Shimoi for information regarding the water-solubility of iodine and cesium elements.
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